| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4013 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4013 |
| Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions | |
| Robert H. Porter; J. Douglas Zona | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines bidding in auctions for state highway construction contracts on Long Island in the early 1980s, in order to determine whether bid rigging occurred. Detection of collusion is possible because of limited participation in the collusive scheme. The paper looks at differences in behavior between ring members and non-members. In these auctions, collusio did not take the form of a bid rotation scheme, in which only one ring member submits a bid. Instead, several ring members bid on most jobs. The apparent role of ring meetings prior to the auction was to designate a serious bidder, and its bid, and the other firms then frequently submitted phony higher bids. The bidding data indicate that the bids of non-cartel firms, as well as their rank distribution, were related to cost measures, such as how much backlog a firm was carrying. In contrast, the rank distribution of higher cartel bids was unrelated to similar cost measures, and differed from the distribution of the low cartel bid. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4013 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561355 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert H. Porter,J. Douglas Zona. Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4013.pdf（1041KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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