全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w4071
来源ID	Working Paper 4071
	GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation
	Dan Kovenock; Marie Thursby
发表日期	1992-05-01
出版年	1992
语种	英语
摘要	This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from 'international obligation," a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GAIT-DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.
主题	International Economics ; Trade ; Other ; Law and Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w4071
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561414
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dan Kovenock,Marie Thursby. GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation. 1992.