| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4125 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4125 |
| Robin-Hooding Rents: Exploiting the Pecuniary Effects of In-Kind Programs | |
| Richard Zeckhauser; Steve Coate; Stephen Johnson | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The pecuniary effects of cash and in-kind programs differ. A program that builds housing for the poor, for example, is likely to result in a lower price of existing low-income housing than would an equally costly cash transfer program. Low-income renters in general would benefit; landlords would lose. The process we label Robin-Hooding rents employs in-kind programs to transfer rents from one group in society to another, Direct taxation of "donor" groups may be infeasible because their incomes can't be monitored, they are engaged in illegal activities, they are foreign, or the government's administrative apparatus is ineffective. A general equilibrium analysis reveals that absent the ability to target taxation, Robin-Hooding may be a valuable second-best transfer instrument. Robin-Hooding also has drawbacks, Its incentive effects are significant, for today's rents flow from yesterday's investment activities. Moreover, even when Robin-Hooding is undesirable, parochial government agencies may be tempted to employ it as a means to escape the scrutiny of the budget process. The real world use of Robin-Hooding in both developed and developing nations is discussed. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4125 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561474 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Zeckhauser,Steve Coate,Stephen Johnson. Robin-Hooding Rents: Exploiting the Pecuniary Effects of In-Kind Programs. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4125.pdf（1761KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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