| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4145 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4145 |
| Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies | |
| Joseph E. Stiglitz; Aaron S. Edlin | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management, the board of directors, and rival management teams or takeover artists. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4145 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561497 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph E. Stiglitz,Aaron S. Edlin. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4145.pdf（1740KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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