| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4351 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4351 |
| The Political Economy of Controls: Complexity | |
| Anne O. Krueger; Roderick Duncan | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Increasing complexity of regulation over time is a regular empirical phenomenon whenever political processes attempt to control economic activity. In this paper it is argued that a tendency toward increasing complexity of controls is probably inherent in most efforts to regulate, and that the great likelihood that it will occur should be taken into account in initial policy formulation. Economic policy analyses may be correct as formulated on the assumption that the initial policies will be adopted and not be altered, but be wrong if it is recognized that increased complexity may be an inevitable cost of the policy. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4351 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anne O. Krueger,Roderick Duncan. The Political Economy of Controls: Complexity. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4351.pdf（3218KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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