| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4381 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4381 |
| Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance | |
| Andrew Atkeson; Robert E. Lucas, Jr. | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation? |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4381 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561750 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Atkeson,Robert E. Lucas, Jr.. Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4381.pdf（346KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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