| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4427 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4427 |
| Favoritism in Organizations | |
| Canice Prendergast; Robert H. Topel | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Performance evaluations for workers are typically subjective impressions held by supervisors rather than easily quantifiable measures of output. We argue that perhaps the most important aspect this is that it gives supervisors the opportunity to exercise their personal preference towards their employees in a way that is detrimental for performance. both for incentive reasons and through misallocation of workers to jobs. We illustrate that firms will respond to this problem in a number of ways. First, they will make compensation less sensitive to performance, even when workers are risk neutral. Furthermore, firms will typically use bureaucratic procedures for allocating rewards, even though these are known to be ex post inefficient. In addition, firms may tie wages to jobs as a means of credibly rewarding the best performers. These organizational changes are used because directly monitoring supervisors' decisions is fraught with problems, among them the creation of 'yes men,' so that the indirect mechanisms described above are likely to be optimal responses to favoritism. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4427 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561799 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Canice Prendergast,Robert H. Topel. Favoritism in Organizations. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4427.pdf（3660KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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