| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w4448
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 4448
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| Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers |
| Allan Drazen; Paul R. Masson
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| 发表日期 | 1993-09-01
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| 出版年 | 1993
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Standard models of policy credibility. defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out. emphasize the preferences of the policymaker (his "type") and the role of policies in signaling type. Whether a policy is carried out. however. should also reflect the state of the economy. so that even a "tough" policymaker may renege on an announced policy in adverse circumstances. We investigate this alternative notion of credibility, using an "escape clause" model of devaluation. in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in the process driving unemployment, following a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. in contrast to the results in the earlier literature. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Fiscal Policy
; International Economics
; International Finance
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4448
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561824
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Allan Drazen,Paul R. Masson. Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers. 1993.
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文件名：
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w4448.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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