| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4507 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4507 |
| Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Daniel L. Rubinfeld | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the desired degee of deterrence with lower litigation costs. This result is developed first in a model in which all suits are assumed to go to trial and then in a model in which settlements are possible. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4507 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561884 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4507.pdf（97KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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