全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Non-Leaky Buckets: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Agency Costs

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w4652
来源ID	Working Paper 4652
	Non-Leaky Buckets: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Agency Costs
	Karla Hoff; Andrew B. Lyon
发表日期	1994-02-01
出版年	1994
语种	英语
摘要	Economists have generally argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate incomes. We provide a counter-example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints. In the model, a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor-leisure choices, but the grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in human capital. We prove that simple redistributive policies can yield Pareto improvements and increase aggregate incomes. Where higher education is beyond the reach of the poor, the wage tax- transfer policy is under most circumstances more effective than targeted credit taxes or subsidies in increasing over-all efficiency.
主题	Public Economics ; Taxation ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w4652
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562038
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Karla Hoff,Andrew B. Lyon. Non-Leaky Buckets: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Agency Costs. 1994.