| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4654 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4654 |
| Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion | |
| Larry Lang; Annette Poulsen; Rene M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, (2) a successful asset sale is good news and (3) the stock market discounts asset sale proceeds retained by the selling firm. In support of this hypothesis, we find that the typical firm in our sample performs poorly before the sale and that the average stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive only when the proceeds are paid out. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4654 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Larry Lang,Annette Poulsen,Rene M. Stulz. Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4654.pdf（537KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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