全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w4704
来源ID	Working Paper 4704
	Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
	R. Glenn Hubbard; Darius Palia
发表日期	1994-04-01
出版年	1994
语种	英语
摘要	This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
主题	Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w4704
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562098
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	R. Glenn Hubbard,Darius Palia. Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry. 1994.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w4704.pdf（346KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览