| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/t0098 |
| 来源ID | Technical Working Paper 0098 |
| Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Lars A. Stole | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies managerial decisions about investment in long-run projects in the presence of imperfect information (the market knows less about such investments than the firm's managers) and short-term managerial objectives (the managers are concerned about the short-term stock price as well as the long-term stock price). Prior work has suggested that imperfect information and short-term managerial objectives induce managers to underinvest in long-run projects. We show that either underinvestment or overinvestment is possible, and we identify the connection between the type of informational imperfection present and the direction of the distortion. When investors cannot observe the level of investment in long-run projects, suboptimal investment will be induced. When investors can observe investment but not its productivity, however, an excessive level of investment will be induced. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/t0098 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562121 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Lars A. Stole. Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| t0098.pdf（1122KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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