| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4731 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4731 |
| An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On FrivolousSuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11 | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Howard F. Chang | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that, when plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither the American rule of litigation cost allocation (under which each litigant bears its own expenses) nor the British rule (under which the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would induce plaintiffs to make optimal decisions to bring suit. In particular, plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are sufficiently small relative to the amount at stake, and plaintiffs may not bring some meritorious suits when litigation costs are sufficiently large relative to the amount at stake. We analyze the effect of more general fee-shifting rules that are based not only upon the identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to be at the end of the trial -- that is, the 'margin of victory.' In particular, we explore how and when one can design such a rule to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they believe their cases are sufficiently strong. Our analysis suggests some considerations to guide the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4731 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562128 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Howard F. Chang. An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On FrivolousSuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4731.pdf（518KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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