| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w4849
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 4849
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| Threats and Promises |
| Jonathan Eaton; Maxim Engers
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| 发表日期 | 1994-09-01
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| 出版年 | 1994
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Global environmental concerns have increased the sensitivity of governments and other parties to the actions of those outside their national jurisdiction. Parties have tried to extend influence extraterritorially both by promising to reward desired behavior and by threatening to punish undesired behavior. If information were perfect, the Coase theorem would suggest that either method of seeking influence could provide an efficient outcome. If the parties in question have incomplete information about each other's costs and benefits from different actions, however, either method can be costly, both to those seeking influence and in terms of overall efficiency. We compare various methods of seeking influence. A particular issue is dissembling: taking an action to mislead the other party about the cost or benefit of that action. By creating an incentive to dissemble, attempts to influence another's behavior can have the perverse effect of actually encouraging the action that one is trying to discourage. |
| 主题 | International Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4849
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562260
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jonathan Eaton,Maxim Engers. Threats and Promises. 1994.
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文件名：
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w4849.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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