| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4907 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4907 |
| Investment Opportunities, Managerial Decisions, and the Security Issue Decision | |
| Kooyul Jung; Yong-Cheol Kim; Rene M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | With agency costs of managerial discretion, equity financing is advantageous for the shareholders of firms with valuable investment opportunities but not for the shareholders of other firms. Accordingly, we find that firms with good investment opportunities are more likely to issue equity than debt, have a smaller abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced, and experience substantial asset growth following the issue. Firms that issue equity even though they do not have good investment opportunities experience a larger abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced and invest more after the issue than comparable firms that issue debt. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4907 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562322 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kooyul Jung,Yong-Cheol Kim,Rene M. Stulz. Investment Opportunities, Managerial Decisions, and the Security Issue Decision. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4907.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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