| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4915 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4915 |
| Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages | |
| Aaron S. Edlin | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when courts use an expectation damage remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front payments with what we call 'Cadillac' contracts (contracts for a very high quality or quantity). This combination provides efficient investment incentives in complex contracting problems when an expectation damage remedy is accompanied by a broad duty to mitigate damages. This indicates that an expectation remedy is well-suited to multidimensional, but one-sided, investment problems, in contrast to specific performance, which Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] showed is well-suited to two-sided, but unidimensional, investment problems. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4915 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562333 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aaron S. Edlin. Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4915.pdf（440KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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