| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5007 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5007 |
| Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment | |
| Aaron S. Edlin; Stefan Reichelstein | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after uncertainty about the desirability of trade is resolved. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages is applied. Specific performance can also induce both parties to invest efficiently, provided a separability condition holds. In contrast, expectation damages is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5007 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562436 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aaron S. Edlin,Stefan Reichelstein. Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5007.pdf（1368KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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