| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w5064
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 5064
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| Modern Approaches to Central Banking |
| Stanley Fischer
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| 发表日期 | 1995-03-01
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| 出版年 | 1995
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Modern theory has delivered both the conservative central banker and the principal-agent approaches as rationales for the independence of the central bank. The principal-agent approach directs attention to the importance of both clearly defining the goals of the central bank and its command in order to meet the targets assigned to it. The empirical evidence shows not only that greater independence is associated with lower inflation, but also that the central bank's rights not to finance the government and to set interest rates independently increase its effectiveness. The role of inflation targeting and the distinction between price level and inflation targeting are also analyzed. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5064
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562497
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Stanley Fischer. Modern Approaches to Central Banking. 1995.
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文件名：
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w5064.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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