| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5136 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5136 |
| How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops | |
| Nicholas Barberis; Maxim Boycko; Andrei Shleifer; Natalia Tsukanova | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as capital renovation, change in suppliers, increase in hours that stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role that new human capital plays in economic transformation. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5136 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562572 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas Barberis,Maxim Boycko,Andrei Shleifer,et al. How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5136.pdf（534KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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