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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w5210
来源IDWorking Paper 5210
The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks
Nicholas Economides; R. Glenn Hubbard; Darius Palia
发表日期1995-08-01
出版年1995
语种英语
摘要This paper suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by political considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions were instituted for the benefit of the small, unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large, multi- unit banks. We analyze this 'political hypothesis' in two steps. First, we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and government-sponsored deposit insurance. We then find strong evidence for the political hypothesis by examining the voting record of Congress.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w5210
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562655
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Nicholas Economides,R. Glenn Hubbard,Darius Palia. The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks. 1995.
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