| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5210 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5210 |
| The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks | |
| Nicholas Economides; R. Glenn Hubbard; Darius Palia | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by political considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions were instituted for the benefit of the small, unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large, multi- unit banks. We analyze this 'political hypothesis' in two steps. First, we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and government-sponsored deposit insurance. We then find strong evidence for the political hypothesis by examining the voting record of Congress. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5210 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562655 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas Economides,R. Glenn Hubbard,Darius Palia. The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5210.pdf（486KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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