| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5248 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5248 |
| Economic Issues in Vaccine Purchase Arrangements | |
| David S. Salkever; Richard G. Frank | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Federal purchases of major childhood vaccines account for roughly half of the total market for these vaccines. This paper examines Federal purchasing practices in the context of the recent literature on bidding and procurement, and compares these practices to UNICEF vaccine procurement arrangements. Federal contracts were awarded to a single winner and the firms eligible to bid were limited in number (since the number of U.S. licensed firms is small). Since production capacity cannot be expanded quickly, and the Federal share of purchases is large, it is hypothesized that firms' bid prices will be higher for larger contracts. The paper analyzes contracts over the period 1977 through 1992 to determine the contract size-price relationship, as well as effects on contract prices of 1) the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program enacted in 1987 and 2) changes in numbers of firms in the market. Results provide equivocal support for a positive size-price relationship and evidence of a positive price effect of the injury compensation program. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5248 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562695 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David S. Salkever,Richard G. Frank. Economic Issues in Vaccine Purchase Arrangements. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5248.pdf（497KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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