| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5585 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5585 |
| The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data | |
| Francine Lafontaine; Kathryn L. Shaw | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we model the determinants of franchise contract terms, namely royalty rates and franchise fees, using a unique panel data set of about 1000 franchisors for the period 1980-1992. We focus on the extent to which firms adjust the terms of their contracts as they become better established, and find that adjustment is relatively infrequent and that firms do not systematically raise or lower their royalty rates or franchise fees when they do adjust them. These results tend to refute a number of existing theories of franchising that are based on risk-sharing, asymmetric information, and certain incentive structures, but support those based on franchisor opportunism and to some extent double-sided moral hazard. Our results also suggest that when industrial organization economists do not have access to panel data, their work may well suffer from the omitted variable bias caused by unobserved firm effects. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5585 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563059 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francine Lafontaine,Kathryn L. Shaw. The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5585.pdf（2436KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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