| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w5637
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 5637
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| Contracts and Money |
| Boyan Jovanovic; Masako Ueda
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| 发表日期 | 1996-06-01
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| 出版年 | 1996
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We analyze the contractual relation between workers and their employers when there is nominal risk. The key feature of the problem is that the consumption deflator is random and observed sometime after the effort is exerted. The worker's effort is not observable, and to induce the agent to work, second-best contracts do not insure the worker fully. They do eliminate all nominal risk for the parties (by fully indexing the terms of the contracts to the price level) but they would be re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the contract will write one that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a contract, nominal shocks affect real consumption. Since the argument should apply in many situations, it will have macroeconomic implications, one of which is short-run non-neutrality of money. We have found that surprise money is likely to redistribute consumption and welfare towards workers, and away from shareholders. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Money and Interest Rates
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5637
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563114
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Boyan Jovanovic,Masako Ueda. Contracts and Money. 1996.
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文件名：
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w5637.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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