| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5648 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5648 |
| Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence | |
| Rajesh Aggarwal; Andrew A. Samwick | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that strategic interactions between firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts written by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own and their rivals' performance, we show that there will be an inverse relationship between the magnitude of high-powered incentives and the degree of competition in the industry. More competitive industries are characterized by weaker pay-performance incentives. Empirically, we find strong evidence of this inverse relationship in the compensation of executives in the United States. Our econometric results are not consistent with alternative theories of the effect of competition on executive compensation. We conclude that strategic considerations can preclude the use of high-powered incentives, in contrast to the predictions of the standard principal-agent model. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5648 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563128 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rajesh Aggarwal,Andrew A. Samwick. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5648.pdf（2634KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
