| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5662 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5662 |
| United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance? | |
| Joseph C. Mullin; Wallace P. Mullin | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines United States Steel's acquisition by long-term lease of the iron ore properties of the Great Northern Railway. This 1906 transaction, which significantly increased U.S. Steel's already substantial ore holdings, has been characterized by contemporary observers and modern economists as an example of vertical foreclosure. We present quantitative and qualitative evidence to support an alternative view that the lease generated a net efficiency gain, resulting in lower steel prices, as it promoted relationship-specific investment in the exploitation of the ore properties. Quantitatively, we examine the stock market reactions of U.S. Steel, the Great Northern Railway, steel industry rivals, and the railroads, a major steel customer, to the announcement of the lease signing. Strikingly, the railroads had a significant positive excess return. Qualitatively, we examine the terms of the lease and the performance of the parties to document the role of the lease in encouraging relationship-specific investment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5662 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563142 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph C. Mullin,Wallace P. Mullin. United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance?. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5662.pdf（3002KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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