| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5711 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5711 |
| Risk-Shifting by Federally Insured Commercial Banks | |
| Armen Hovakimian; Edward J. Kane | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mispriced and misadministered deposit insurance imparts risk-shifting incentives to U.S. banks. Regulators are expected to monitor and discipline increases in bank risk exposure that would transfer wealth from the FDIC to bank stockholders. This paper assesses the success regulators had in controlling risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985-1994. In contrast to single-equation estimates developed from the option model by others, our simultaneous-equation evidence indicates that regulators failed to prevent large U.S. banks from shifting risk to the FDIC. Moreover, at the margin, banks that are undercapitalized shifted risk more effectively than other sample banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5711 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563195 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Armen Hovakimian,Edward J. Kane. Risk-Shifting by Federally Insured Commercial Banks. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5711.pdf（1060KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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