| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5725 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5725 |
| Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal | |
| Leonardo Bartolini; Allan Drazen | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model in which a government's current capital controls policy signals future policies. Controls on capital outflows evolve in response to news on technology, conditional on government attitudes towards taxation of capital. When there is uncertainty over government types, a policy of liberal capital outflows sends a favorable signal that may trigger a capital inflow. This prediction is consistent with the experience of several countries that have liberalized their capital account |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5725 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563209 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Bartolini,Allan Drazen. Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5725.pdf（1503KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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