| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5745 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5745 |
| Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions | |
| Paul L. Joskow; Richard Schmalensee; Elizabeth M. Bailey | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5745 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563233 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul L. Joskow,Richard Schmalensee,Elizabeth M. Bailey. Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5745.pdf（1553KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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