| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5953 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5953 |
| The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems | |
| William E. Encinosa III; Martin Gaynor; James B. Rebitzer | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper incorporates the sociological concept of group norms' into an economic analysis of pay systems. We use a behavioral microeconomic model and a unique survey of medical groups to examine the theoretical and empirical relationship between group norms and incentive pay. Our findings suggest that, at least for medical groups, norms are binding constraints in the choice of pay practices. While group norms matter, the patterns in the data suggest that they are not all that matters. Analysis of the preferences and activities of individual physicians indicate that factors highlighted by the economic theory of agency, notably income insurance and multi-task considerations, also shape pay policies. The conclusion we draw from these results is that the sociological concept of group norms augments rather than replaces more conventional economic analyses of pay practices. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5953 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563454 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William E. Encinosa III,Martin Gaynor,James B. Rebitzer. The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5953.pdf（2427KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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