| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w5969 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 5969 |
| The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment | |
| David S. Scharfstein; Jeremy C. Stein | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. In an effort to stop rent-seeking, corporate headquarters will be effectively forced into paying bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the form not of cash, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is a kind of socialism' in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions tend to get subsidized by stronger ones. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5969 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563470 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David S. Scharfstein,Jeremy C. Stein. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w5969.pdf（1717KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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