| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6058 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6058 |
| Tax Rates and Work Incentives in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Current Law and Alternative Reforms | |
| Hilary Williamson Hoynes; Robert Moffitt | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Program has long been criticized by economists for its apparent work disincentives stemming from the imposition of 100-percent tax rates on earnings. However, the program has been modified in recent years to allow recipients to keep some of their earnings for fixed periods of time. Moreover, additional proposals have been made for lowering the tax rate further and for providing various additional financial work incentives. We use the basic labor supply model to show the expected effect of these reforms on work effort. In addition, we provide a numerical simulation that shows the magnitude of the monetary incentives provided by the reforms for different categories of individuals. We find that the proposed reforms have ambiguous effects on work effort and could, contrary to perceived wisdom, possibly reduce work effort and increase the number of SSDI recipients. However, the simulations show that reforms based on earnings subsidies for private employers are more likely to increase work effort and to lower the caseload. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6058 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563566 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hilary Williamson Hoynes,Robert Moffitt. Tax Rates and Work Incentives in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Current Law and Alternative Reforms. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6058.pdf（477KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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