| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6086 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6086 |
| Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems | |
| Aaron S. Edlin; Benjamin E. Hermalin | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6086 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563594 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aaron S. Edlin,Benjamin E. Hermalin. Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6086.pdf（579KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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