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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w6086
来源IDWorking Paper 6086
Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems
Aaron S. Edlin; Benjamin E. Hermalin
发表日期1997-07-01
出版年1997
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w6086
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563594
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GB/T 7714
Aaron S. Edlin,Benjamin E. Hermalin. Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems. 1997.
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