| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6115 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6115 |
| Violations of the `Rules of the Game' and the Credibility of the Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914 | |
| Michael D. Bordo; Ronald MacDonald | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the recently noted finding that the Classical gold standard represented a credible, well-behaved target zone system from the perspective of the well-documented failure of countries to play by the rules of the game in the classical period. In particular, we test an hypothesis of Svensson (1994) that a credible target zone can confer on a country a degree of independence in the operation of its monetary policy. We propose a number of ways of testing this proposition and implement them for a newly created monthly data base over the period 1880-1913. We demonstrate that the Classical gold standard worked in the way predicted by Svensson's model. This would seem to have an important bearing on the kind of institutional framework required for a modern day target zone (such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System) to function effectively and, in particular, to weather speculative attacks. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6115 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563623 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Bordo,Ronald MacDonald. Violations of the `Rules of the Game' and the Credibility of the Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6115.pdf（1229KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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