| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w6156
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6156
|
| Social Security and Retirement in Japan |
| Takashi Oshio; Naohiro Yashiro
|
| 发表日期 | 1997-09-01
|
| 出版年 | 1997
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We provide the incentive mechanism of the public pension on the retirement decisions made in the Japanese labor market. Though the labor market participation of Japanese older persons is quite high by international standards, a principle incentive mechanism of the public pension system in Japan affecting the retirement behavior has many things in common with those in other OECD countries. The pension benefits are designed actuarially unfair,' and the decision to work beyond age 60 is penalized. As the population ages quite rapidly, it is wasteful to maintain the disincentive mechanism arising from the actuarially unfair pension scheme for older persons. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6156
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563664
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Takashi Oshio,Naohiro Yashiro. Social Security and Retirement in Japan. 1997.
|
|
文件名：
|
w6156.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
