| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6269 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6269 |
| Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity | |
| Catherine D. Wolfram | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Every day, owners of generating capacity submit bids reflecting a price for power from their plants. The price bid by the last plant used to meet electricity needs in a given time period is the price paid for capacity from all plants. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they bid at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids, all else equal. Lastly, there is some evidence that bids for given plants are higher when the suppliers have more available capacity. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6269 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563779 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Catherine D. Wolfram. Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6269.pdf（2308KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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