| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w6452
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 6452
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| Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals |
| Jon Faust; Lars E. O. Svensson
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| 发表日期 | 1998-03-01
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| 出版年 | 1998
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in the sense that it induces higher inflation, but a less expansionary policy in the sense that it induces lower inflation and employment than expected. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This has a moderating influence on the bank's policy. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial, but frequently not in the interest of the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating incentive on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6452
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563969
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jon Faust,Lars E. O. Svensson. Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals. 1998.
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文件名：
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w6452.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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