| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6454 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6454 |
| A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets | |
| Robert Gibbons; Michael Waldman | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We attempt to explain employment practices in internal labor markets using models that combine job assignment, on-the-job human-capital acquisition, and learning. We show that a framework that integrates these familiar ideas captures a number of recent empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics in internal labor markets, including the following. First, real wage decreases are a minority of the observations, but are not rare, while demotions are very rare. Second, there is significant serial correlation in wage increases. Third, promotions are associated with particularly large wage increases, but these wage increases are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of a job ladder. Fourth, on average, workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of a job ladder are promoted more quickly to the next level. Fifth, individuals promoted from one level of a job ladder to the next come disproportionately, but not exclusively, from the top of the lower job's wage distribution (and arrive disproportionately, but not exclusively, at the bottom of the higher job's wage distribution). |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6454 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563971 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Gibbons,Michael Waldman. A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6454.pdf（1888KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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