| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6544 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6544 |
| Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision | |
| Francine Lafontaine; Margaret E. Slade | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine theoretical predictions and econometric evidence concerning franchise contracting and sales-force compensation and suggest a number of factors that ought to influence the contracts that are written between principles and agents. For each factor, we construct the simplest theoretical model that is capable of capturing what we feel to be its essence. The comparative statics from the theoretical exercise are then used to organize our discussion of the empirical evidence, where the evidence is taken from published studies that have attempted to assess each factor's effect on the power of agent incentives. We also discuss theoretical issues and empirical results pertaining to a few topics that have been addressed in the literature but that do not fit easily into our simple modeling framework. A surprising finding of our survey of retail contracting under exclusive marks is the robust nature of the evidence: although researchers assess different industries over different time periods using a number of proxies for a given factor, their empirical findings are usually consistent with one another. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6544 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564059 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francine Lafontaine,Margaret E. Slade. Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6544.pdf（1891KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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