G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w6544
来源IDWorking Paper 6544
Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision
Francine Lafontaine; Margaret E. Slade
发表日期1998-05-01
出版年1998
语种英语
摘要We examine theoretical predictions and econometric evidence concerning franchise contracting and sales-force compensation and suggest a number of factors that ought to influence the contracts that are written between principles and agents. For each factor, we construct the simplest theoretical model that is capable of capturing what we feel to be its essence. The comparative statics from the theoretical exercise are then used to organize our discussion of the empirical evidence, where the evidence is taken from published studies that have attempted to assess each factor's effect on the power of agent incentives. We also discuss theoretical issues and empirical results pertaining to a few topics that have been addressed in the literature but that do not fit easily into our simple modeling framework. A surprising finding of our survey of retail contracting under exclusive marks is the robust nature of the evidence: although researchers assess different industries over different time periods using a number of proxies for a given factor, their empirical findings are usually consistent with one another.
主题Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w6544
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564059
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Francine Lafontaine,Margaret E. Slade. Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision. 1998.
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