| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w6561
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 6561
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| Outside Equity Financing |
| Stewart C. Myers
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| 发表日期 | 1998-05-01
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| 出版年 | 1998
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper explores the necessary conditions for outside equity financing when insiders, that is managers or entrepreneurs, are self-interested and cash flows are not verifiable. Two control mechanisms are contrasted: a partnership,' in which outside investors can commit assets for a specified period, and a corporation,' in which assets are committed for an indefinite period but insiders can be ejected at any time. The paper also shows how going public to reduce outsiders' power can be efficient if it preserves appropriate incentives for insiders. The concluding section explains how the difficulty of verifying the act of investment leads to monitoring costs and insiders' pursuit of private benefits of control. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6561
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564075
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Stewart C. Myers. Outside Equity Financing. 1998.
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文件名：
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w6561.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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