| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6594 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6594 |
| Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World | |
| Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silane; Andrei Shleifer; Robert Vishny | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-06-12 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call substitute a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends. We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in 33 countries with different levels of shareholder protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights. The findings on payout levels and other results support the outcome agency model of dividends. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6594 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564140 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silane,Andrei Shleifer,et al. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6594.pdf（902KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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