| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6639 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6639 |
| On the Regulation of Fee Structures in Mutual Funds | |
| Sanjiv Ranjan Das; Rangarajan K. Sundaram | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We offer an alternative framework for the analysis of mutual funds and use it to examine the rationale behind existing regulations that require mutual fund advisor fees to be of the fulcrum' variety. We find little justification for the regulations. Indeed, we find that asymmetric incentive fees' in which the advisor receives a flat fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index provide Pareto-dominant outcomes with a lower level of equilibrium volatility. Our model also offers some insight into fee structures actually in use in the asset-management industry. We find that when leveraging is not permitted and the fee structure must be of the fulcrum variety, the equilibrium fee in our model is a flat fee with no performance component; if asymmetric incentive fees are allowed and leveraging is permitted the equilibrium fee is an incentive fee with a large performance component. These predictions match observed fee structures in the mutual fund industry and the hedge fund industry, respectively. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6639 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564151 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sanjiv Ranjan Das,Rangarajan K. Sundaram. On the Regulation of Fee Structures in Mutual Funds. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6639.pdf（1471KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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