全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w6689
来源ID	Working Paper 6689
	Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising
	Eduardo M.R.A. Engel; Ronald D. Fischer; Alexander Galetovic
发表日期	1998-08-01
出版年	1998
语种	英语
摘要	In recent years several countries have started massive highway franchising programs auctioned to private firms. In these auctions, the regulator typically sets the franchise term and firms bid on tolls, or, alternatively, the regulator sets tolls and the winner is the firm that asks for the shortest franchise term. In this paper we argue that many of the problems that highway franchises have encountered are due to the fact that the franchise term cannot adjust to demand realizations. We propose a new auction mechanism where the firm that bids the least present value of revenue from tolls (LPVR) wins the franchise. With this scheme, the franchise length adjusts endogenously to demand realizations. Assuming that the regulator is not allowed to make transfers to the franchise holder that firms are unable to diversify risk completely due to agency problems auctions are optimal, even when the regulator does not know firms' construction costs. Furthermore, for demand uncertainty and risk aversion parameters typical of developing countries, welfare gains associated with substituting a LPVR auction for a fixed-term auction are large (e.g. one-third of the cost of the highway).
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Public Goods
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w6689
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564198
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Eduardo M.R.A. Engel,Ronald D. Fischer,Alexander Galetovic. Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising. 1998.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w6689.pdf（1414KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览