| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w6695
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6695
|
| Incentives in Organizations |
| Robert Gibbons
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-08-01
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations. As a point of departure, I being with a quick sketch of the classic agency model. I then discuss static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations. I conclude by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase and reinvigorated by Williamson, and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
; Labor Market Structures
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6695
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564204
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert Gibbons. Incentives in Organizations. 1998.
|
|
文件名：
|
w6695.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
