| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6744 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6744 |
| Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery | |
| Jon Gruber; John Kim; Dina Mayzlin | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | While there is a large literature investigating the response of treatment intensity to Medicare reimbursement differentials, there is much less work on this question for the Medicaid program. The answers for Medicare may not apply in the Medicaid context, since a smaller share of physician's patients will be Medicaid insured, so that income effects from fee changes may be dominated by substitution effects. We investigate the effect of Medicaid fee differentials on the use of cesarean delivery over the 1988-1992 period. We find, in contrast to the backward-bending supply curve implied by the Medicare literature larger fee differentials between cesarean and normal childbirth for the Medicaid program leads to higher cesarean delivery rates. In particular, we find that the lower fee differentials between cesarean and normal childbirth under the Medicaid program than under private insurance can explain between one-half and three-quarters of the difference between Medicaid and private cesarean delivery rates. Our results suggest that Medicaid reimbursement reductions can cause real reductions in the intensity with which Medicaid patients are treated. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6744 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564253 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jon Gruber,John Kim,Dina Mayzlin. Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6744.pdf（776KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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