| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6765 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6765 |
| Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders | |
| Clifford G. Holderness; Dennis P. Sheehan | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders must be circumscribed by some organizational or legal arrangements. Empirical investigations reveal that boards of directors in majority-owned firms are little different from firms with diffuse stock ownership. Another source of constraints on a majority shareholders -- capital market activity -- also appears to be no different from firms with diffuse ownership. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks of stock. The frequency and associated wealth effects of reorganizations of majority shareholder firms, however, indicate that the law constrains managerial majority shareholders, both in their day-to-day management and when they redeem the ownership interest of minority shareholders. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6765 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564274 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Clifford G. Holderness,Dennis P. Sheehan. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6765.pdf（1983KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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