全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Case for a Populist Banker

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w6802
来源ID	Working Paper 6802
	The Case for a Populist Banker
	Andres Velasco; Vincenzo Guzzo
发表日期	1998-11-01
出版年	1998
语种	英语
摘要	We present a general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank conservatism on economic performance. Several striking conclusions emerge. In relatively centralized labor markets employment and output are decreasing and inflation is initially increasing and then decreasing in the degree of central bank conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation (alternatively, who is not conservative) maximizes social welfare. Economic performance is not U-shaped in the degree of centralization of the labor market, in contrast to conventional wisdom.
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w6802
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564311
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andres Velasco,Vincenzo Guzzo. The Case for a Populist Banker. 1998.