| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6825 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6825 |
| Measuring Adverse Selection in Managed Health Care | |
| Richard G. Frank; Jacob Glazer; Thomas G. McGuire | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Health plans paid by capitation have an incentive to distort the quality of services they offer to attract profitable and to deter unprofitable enrollees. We characterize plans' rationing as imposing a show that the profit maximizing shadow price depends on the dispersion in health costs, how well individuals forecast their health costs, the correlation between use in different illness categories, and the risk adjustment system used for payment. We further show how these factors can be combined in an empirically implementable index that can be used to identify the services that will be most distorted in competition among managed care plans. A simple welfare measure is developed to quantify the distortion caused by selection incentives. We illustrate the application of our ideas with a Medicaid data set, and conduct policy analyses of risk adjustment and other options for dealing with adverse selection. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6825 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564336 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard G. Frank,Jacob Glazer,Thomas G. McGuire. Measuring Adverse Selection in Managed Health Care. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6825.pdf（1623KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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