| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6933 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6933 |
| Contingent Protection as Better Insurance | |
| Ronald D. Fischer; Thomas J. Prusa | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may not involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail an export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6933 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564448 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ronald D. Fischer,Thomas J. Prusa. Contingent Protection as Better Insurance. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6933.pdf（169KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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