| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7070 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7070 |
| Innovation Fertility and Patent Design | |
| Hugo A. Hopenhayn; Matthew F. Mitchell | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It may be advantageous to provide a variety of kinds of patent protection to heterogenous innovations. Innovations which benefit society largely through their use as building blocks to future inventions may require a different scope of protection in order to be encouraged. We model the problem of designing an optimal patent menu (scope and length) when the fertility of an innovation in generating more innovations cannot be observed. The menu of patent scope can be implemented with mandated buyout fees. Evidence of heterogeneous fertility and patent obsolescence, keys to the model, are presented using patent data from the US. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7070 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564596 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hugo A. Hopenhayn,Matthew F. Mitchell. Innovation Fertility and Patent Design. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7070.pdf（1597KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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